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Texas Tech University
Abstract
The call for evidenced-based policies in the field of education has prompted the
encouragement of a greater reliance on experimental designs. Without an awareness of the
limitations of Null Hypothesis Statistical Testing (NHST), these changes will likely fail in
making educational research more influential. NHST does not yield practical information.
Researchers and educators must work together to develop theory that is meaningful and practical
that can be tested and replicated over time. The purpose of this article is to revisit the limitations
of NHST while explaining how these limitations are important to practitioners.
Introduction
The implementation of evidence-based polices has challenged educators to evaluate their
teaching and related outcomes using experimental or quasiexperimental designs (U.S. Congress,
2001). Legislators have encouraged administrators, teachers, and school psychologists to base
their educational decisions on “proven” models (U.S. Department of Education, 1999) and have
described the field of education as “incapable of the cumulative progress that follows from the
application of the scientific method and from the systematic collection and use of objective
information in policy making” (U.S. Department of Education, 2002, p. 48). Slavin (2002)
expressed hope that this emphasis on causal designs and research-based practices will do nothing
short of revolutionize education, much like the transformation experienced by other fields, such
as medicine and agriculture. However, he also acknowledged that sudden breakthroughs in the
field of education comparable to the Salk polio vaccine, for example, are not likely to occur.
Instead, Slavin (2002) advocated for “dozens or hundreds of randomized or carefully matched
experiments going on each year on all aspects of educational practice” so that “steady
irreversible progress” will result to improve education (p. 19).
Certainly, we agree with Slavin (2002) that education can be revolutionized through the
use of evidenced-based policies when randomized or carefully matched experiments that are
replicated are employed. However, we believe that not all legislators and educators will
understand the importance of the latter part of that statement, and instead will exaggerate the
importance of results yielded from single experimental studies and Null Hypothesis Statistical
Testing (NHST). Equating the word “proven” with “experimental-control comparisons on
standards-based measures” (U.S. Department of Education, 1999) when social sciences and
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education researchers avoid this word due to its inappropriateness considering the inevitable
statistical and methodological weaknesses associated with NHST warrants concern.
Although NHST “is surely the most bone-headedly misguided procedure ever
institutionalized” (Rozeboom, 1997, p. 335), many researchers continue to place their trust in its
results. NHST is employed to determine if a result, such as a difference between control and
treatment group means, is so extreme that it is not likely this difference would occur given the
null hypothesis is true. A continued reliance on NHST will be necessary to meet the goals of
legislators to base educational practice on research. According to Mulaik, Raju, and Harshman
(1997), eliminating NHST is unlikely as long as researchers have a need to differentiate results
that occur by chance and those that are systematic, which is often the case in educational
research. Ironically, Chow (1998) argued that researchers ask too much of NHST, assuming that
it provides practical information when it clearly does not. Although Chow (1998) posited that
NHST is still a valuable statistical technique, others have accused NHST of impeding the
advancement of psychology and other social sciences (Carver, 1978, 1993; Cohen, 1994;
Schmidt & Hunter, 1997). “Even if properly used in the scientific method, educational research
would still be better off without statistical significance testing” (Carver, 1978, p. 398).
Berkson (1938) may be the first credited with attacking the overall utility of NHST,
followed by the strong criticisms identified by Rozeboom (1960), Meehl (1967), Bakan (1966),
and Lykken (1968). More recently, Cohen (1990, 1994), Hunter (1997), Pollard (1993), and
Schmidt (1996) have helped to revive the argument with their poignant concerns. This issue
apparently central to the future of scientific inquiry into the disciplines of psychology, also
captured the attention of the American Psychological Association, which appointed a task force
to examine the problem (Wilkinson and Task Force on Statistical Inference APA Board of
Scientific Affairs, 1999).
Although some expected the APA Task Force on Statistical Inference would recommend
an outright NHST ban (Kirk, 1996), the Task Force’s findings instead urged researchers to focus
on basic methodological issues and the appropriate interpretation of results. These
recommendations supported the view that the criticisms of NHST are most likely related to the
misinterpretation of data by the researcher rather than an inherent theoretical or philosophical
flaw in the statistical method itself (Wainer, 1999). Others have echoed the emphasis upon the
individual researcher’s responsibility in utilizing informed judgment and sensibility in his or her
use of inferential statistical methods (Cohen, 1994; Grayson, 1998).
This is the opportune time to again consider this issue in the field of education. As greater
numbers of researchers are being called upon to share their findings with those in practice,
researchers should be reminded of their responsibility in ensuring that not only they recognize
the limitations of NHST, but that consumers of their research will as well. Furthermore, we
believe that educational practitioners should be an informed public, especially when the
decisions they make will directly affect the education and lives of many children. Turning to
textbooks will not provide a remedy for this problem as many textbooks fail to mention that a
controversy even exists (Gliner, Leech, & Morgan, 2002). The purpose of this article is to revisit
the theoretical and applied problems of NHST so that researchers can most appropriately
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interpret and convey results to avoid misunderstanding and practitioners can understand the
following practical implications.
1.
2.
3.
4.

A statistically significant finding does not warrant an immediate and palpable
change in practice.
A statistically nonsignificant finding does not warrant an immediate change in
practice.
A statistically significant finding does not indicate that the effect is strong or even
important.
A statistically significant finding should be evaluated using one’s own experience,
knowledge of replicated studies, and collaborative experiences with educational
researchers.
Misunderstanding the Null Hypothesis

Cohen (1994) addressed the question of what is wrong with NHST rather eloquently
when he wrote, “Well, among many other things, it does not tell us what we want to know, and
we so much want to know what we want to know that, out of desperation, we nevertheless
believe that it does!” (p. 997). Researchers commonly fail to understand that when a significant
result does not occur, this simply means that the null hypothesis is probably true, not that it is
true or that no difference is present. Numerous researchers have made incorrect statements
referring to the presence of no differences or no relationships in their published work (Cohen,
1990).
Consider the example of an educational researcher interested in investigating the
difference in science interest between two groups of students; one that has been able to remotely
employ a university telescope to learn about science and another that has learned about science
through traditional classroom activities. The researcher suspects that students who have been
exposed to the novel learning opportunity, the remotely operated telescope, will subsequently
report a greater interest in science. However, instead of evaluating whether or not a difference
exists, NHST only allows the researcher to assess if the level of science interest is the same for
both students exposed to the telescope and those not exposed to the telescope. First, consider the
interpretation if the researcher completes the analysis and discovers that there is no statistically
significant difference in the level of science interest between the two groups of students. Instead
of indicating that no difference exists between the two groups, probabilistic reasoning states that
if the null hypothesis is true, a difference observed between the two groups of students would
probably not occur by chance or is not rare enough.
Second, consider the possibility in which the researcher’s findings indicate a significant
difference is present between the level of science interest of students who worked with the
telescope and those who did not work with the telescope, with those students working with the
telescope reporting higher levels of subsequent science interest. Again, the reasoning is
probabilistic and indicates that in the event that no difference exists in the level of science
interest reported, then the discovery that a difference was found between the two groups is
unlikely. Therefore, what is actually accepted is the “unlikelihood” of the null hypothesis, not the
likelihood of a difference occurring.
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Although the belief is widespread that the level of significance at which the null is
rejected is the actual probability that the null is correct, this is certainly not the case (Cohen,
1994) and has been coined the “permanent illusion” by Gigerenzer (1993). “Yet how often do we
see such a result to be taken to mean, at least implicitly, that the effect is significant, that is,
important, large. If a result is highly significant, say p < .001, the temptation to make this
interpretation is all but irresistible” (Cohen, 1990, p. 1307). Because the p value is not a
probability concerning the parameters, but a probability about the data (Grayson, 1998) our
educational researcher knows nothing about the truth of the alternate or research hypothesis and
cannot say that students who work with telescopes are significantly more likely than those who
do not work with telescopes to have a high level of science interest. In addition, our researcher
cannot estimate the probability of rejecting the null hypothesis in future replications.
Schools that have access to the university telescope may serve students who possess
higher levels of socioeconomic status than those schools without access. These students may
have greater opportunities to experience science outside of the school day than those students
who attend the school without access to the telescope who may also come from low
socioeconomic backgrounds. Because of the former group’s greater overall exposure to science,
these students may have a greater opportunity to develop an interest in science than those
students of the latter group. In classical probability theory, an event has an equal chance or
independent chance of occurring (i.e., the roll of an unbiased die), whereas certainty is lost when
this equal likelihood is not present (Mood, Graybill, & Boes, 1974). The researcher’s scenario
can be equated to throwing biased dice, which means that each side is not equally likely to be
rolled. As a result, frequency probability or a posteriori probability must be utilized. “Note that
although the relative frequency of the different outcomes are predictable, the actual outcome of
an individual throw is unpredictable” (Mood, Graybill, & Boes, 1974, p. 6). This reductionist
method that condenses numerous individual observations to a single number, the mean, does not
provide the researcher with information concerning the science interest of any individual student;
the very information that concerned parents will want to know before taking on hardships to
enroll their children in a science program that employs a large telescope to promote science
interest.
Results from NHST tell us nothing about the individual case, and some would extend this
concern to the researcher’s ability to tell the research consumer about the population of students
under investigation. NHST provides information about what to do with the null hypothesis; reject
it or fail to reject it. However, further consideration about the meaning of the null hypothesis, or
the statement that the test parameter is equal to zero, reveals yet another problem. The
considerable overlap that exists among variables measured in the social sciences and education
make the idea that the null hypothesis is equivalent to zero unrealistic (Cohen, 1990). Therefore,
Cohen (1994) referred to the null hypothesis as the “nil” hypothesis (p. 1000). If this logic is
difficult to follow, again think back to the example of the researcher investigating differences in
the level of science interest subsequently reported by students who learned about science using a
telescope and those who learned about science in a traditional manner. The null hypothesis
indicates that the subsequent level of science interest reported by both groups of students would
be exactly the same, hence no difference. In reality, this lack of a difference is highly unlikely,
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not because the two groups are actually different, but because the variables will not be measured
without error. Simply by chance, the two groups will be different, at least to a small degree.
Suppose the researcher uses self-report to determine the subsequent level of science
interest of both groups of students. One student may overestimate her interest in science, a
second student might underestimate his, and a third student might simply randomly respond to
the interest items. As a result, differences in the level of science interest reported by students will
simply differ due to these issues, all of which are considered error. When the null hypothesis is
false, which is always the case in the real world, even to the smallest degree, a large enough
sample size will result in its rejection (Cohen, 1994). “If the probability of a point hypothesis is
indeterminate, the empirical discovery that such a hypothesis is false is no discovery at all, and
thus adds nothing to what is already known” (Krueger, 2001). This returns us to the initial
argument that NHST does not tell us what we want to know, and we are not always certain what
it is really telling us. Therefore, practitioners may very well be utterly confused concerning how
to utilize such flawed information, especially when they are being called upon to do so.
To best convey practical implications, revisiting our interest researcher is necessary.
First, consider that the interest researcher fails to reject the null hypothesis. In other words, the
researcher has not found a significant difference between the science interest scores of the group
receiving science instruction using a telescope and the group receiving traditional science
instruction. Does this mean that a school interested in employing novel tasks, such as working
with a remotely operated telescope to increase students’ science interest should save its resources
and continue utilizing traditional science instruction? Furthermore, should a school that has been
investing resources in novel science activities cease in this expenditure? Finally, should parents
trying to increase their children’s interest in science stop spending their time visiting
planetariums and money purchasing amateur telescopes to view the night sky? The answer to
these questions is a resounding “no” based on statistical limitations alone.
Although no significant difference was found between the mean science interest scores of
the two groups, a difference was likely present. Certainly, this difference could just be a result of
measurement and experimental error; however, if the researcher failed to employ a large enough
sample size, the experiment may have lacked the power to actually discover the difference. In
other words, the use of the telescope may have resulted in higher levels of science interest. This
logic also creates concerns when considering the second circumstance in which the null
hypothesis is rejected or the researcher did find significantly higher levels of interest in the group
exposed to the telescope. In this case, the researcher could have employed a sample size large
enough to detect even the smallest difference. As a result, differences resulting from only error
and not from the actual treatment (i.e., exposure to the telescope) would be viewed as rare and
not likely to occur if the null were true. This example illustrates that while schools should not
eliminate programs based on a failure to reject the null, they should also not spend resources on
purchasing programs or interventions based on a significant result or rejection of the null.
NHST is a technique that employs dichotomous reasoning alone. The only information
yielded is whether or not the null should be rejected for the data analyzed. The research
consumer must be aware that the NHST result does not provide practical information, such as
whether a school should employ the treatment tested. In fact, some have pointed out that
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statistical hypotheses may be reconsidered once further evidence from practical sources has been
evaluated (Mulaik, Raju, & Harshman, 1997). Although schools may be presented with
“significant” results and differences, such findings are only one piece of evidence that should be
evaluated when making practical decisions. Furthermore, educators should recognize that
significance levels only indicate the probability that the result occurred by chance, not the
probability that the effect will happen in the population or the probability of the effect being
replicated. Practitioners should be wary when “highly significant” results are touted for a certain
treatment, intervention, or program. Instead, they should be interested in finding information
concerning the effect size or issues of estimation using confidence interval.
Power Analysis, Effect Sizes, and Confidence Intervals
After discussing the problems associated with the null hypothesis, one might be surprised
that a statistical method plagued with so many fundamental problems would still be employed by
researchers. Interestingly, arguments over the appropriateness of NHST have been ongoing
(Harlow, 1997). In addition, some who have expressed considerable opposition to the
appropriateness of the method have continued to employ NHST in their published work
(Greenwald, Gonzalez, Harris, & Guthrie, 1996). Even the APA Task Force on Statistical
Inference did not recommend an outright ban on NHST (Wilkinson and Task Force on Statistical
Inference APA Board of Scientific Affairs, 1999). Instead, the Task Force encouraged that
researchers employ effect sizes, confidence intervals, and power analyses to provide the
information that is really desired. A number of major journals in the field of education adopted
new guidelines that required authors to supply this information as it might actually answer the
questions concerning what we really want to know.
Fisher (1935), the founding father of NHST, only endorsed the advancement of science
through the use of inductive inference, which is essentially related to the rejection of the null
hypothesis. As aforementioned, the weaknesses related to the null hypothesis have been duly
identified; however the reader might wonder about the role of the alternate or research
hypothesis. Fisher did not consider the alternate hypothesis in NHST. The idea of having two
hypotheses was instead introduced by Neyman and Pearson (1928). With this creation, one can
estimate an alpha risk, the rejection of the null when it is true, as well as a beta risk, or the failure
to reject the null when it is false. Consequently, this information allows researchers to estimate
the sample size necessary to find a significant result. Researchers can also find the probability of
rejecting the null hypothesis based on the effect size, alpha, and the sample size by calculating
beta, which is referred to as the statistical power of the test (Cohen 1994).
Researchers should recognize that inherent differences are most always present between
groups under study. Certainly these differences are often related to measurement error, such as in
the example of the educational researcher studying students’ science interest who found that
some students overestimated their interest, whereas others underestimated it. With a large
enough sample size this meager difference could result in a significant result or a Type I error.
That is, the null was rejected when, in fact, it was true or true as one would expect it to be.
However, sometimes a real difference can exist between groups as a result of the treatment (i.e.,
learning science using a telescope) that is not statistically significant. This may occur when the
measurement error is great, which results in a mean difference that is not extreme enough to be
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considered rare. In other words, so much variation already exists between the two group means
as a result of many undetermined errors that the real difference is not identified. In this
circumstance, the null is actually false, but not rejected. If the researcher would have conducted a
power analysis before NHST he or she would have been able to calculate the sample size
necessary to detect even a negligible effect at a prespecified level of probability. In this case, if
the researcher found that the results were not significant and the effect was not detected when
utilizing the calculated sample size, then the researcher could conclude that no nontrivial effect
was present. Despite the method’s apparent benefits, power analysis is rarely utilized by
researchers, which may be related to the extremely large sample sizes required to put into
practice such reasoning (Cohen, 1990).
In spite of the obvious drawback of Cohen’s (1990) suggested employment of power
analysis, he identified the advantage that researchers would be encouraged to take the magnitude
of effects into account. NHST seems to discourage this incremental understanding of phenomena
as it works to advance science in a binary fashion. Following NHST the researcher only has to
decide if the null can be rejected or not. The determination is based on a cutoff criterion, often
set at .05, which raises the concern of the meaning of one’s findings when the p value only
reaches .055. Information concerning to what degree the effect is supporting the null hypothesis
is not available. “Because science is inevitably about magnitudes, it is not surprising how
frequently p values are treated as surrogates for effect sizes” (Cohen, 1990, p. 1309).
Instead of relying upon such misinterpretation, the use of effect sizes, or mean
differences, correlations, and squared correlations, to report the magnitude of the results has been
recommended (Cohen, 1990, 1994; Harlow, 1997; Wright, 2003). Effect sizes are often reported
in the context of a confidence interval, which provides a range of values with a given probability.
Cohen (1994) strongly advocated for reporting the confidence intervals as they reveal
information about both the “nil hypothesis” and the “non-nil hypothesis” (p.1002). Thus, the
researcher who reports confidence intervals supplies information concerning whether the effect
size is significant while also providing an estimate concerning what range of values it might
have.
For example, suppose our interest researcher rejects the null hypothesis because a
significant difference was found between the levels of science interest across two groups, with
the group that learned science through interacting with a telescope reporting higher science
interest than a group who learned science in the traditional manner. Rejecting the null is only a
binary decision; that is, reject or fail to reject. This decision lends no insight into how large a
difference in science interest exists between these two groups of students. The researcher can
calculate a point biserial correlation coefficient to evaluate the strength of the relationship
between the group membership and science interest. If the relationship is weak, then the
researcher can assume that other factors must be explored to fully understand the development of
science interest and if the relationship is strong, then the researcher may continue this line of
inquiry in order to better understand how novel tasks develop science interest. Furthermore, the
researcher may also calculate confidence intervals, which are determined by specified limits. The
researcher may select a 95% confidence level indicating that the researcher wishes to be 95%
confident that the derived mean estimate for the population will fall within the interval. Thus the
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interest researcher could say that he or she is 95% confident that the mean difference between
two groups in the population would fall between the calculated two limits.
Despite the apparent appeal of power analysis and effect sizes, many researchers continue
to omit them from their research. This omission for some is due to their failure to understand the
concerns associated with the use of NHST; however for others, this omission is related to the
belief that these techniques do not lend valuable information to the researcher (Chow, 1998).
Chow (1998) asserted that statistical power is not capable of revealing the probability of
obtaining statistical significance. “A nonstatistical theoretical justification is required if an
efficacious capability is attributed to statistical power. Because no such justification is offered, it
is only proper not to attach any extra-statistical meaning to the term statistical power” (Chow,
1998, p. 183). The manipulation of sample size suggested by power analysis fails to take into
account factors that may only be addressed through considerations that take place before
research is conducted. Chow (1998) argued that the issue of sample size has much to do with the
stability of the data, which is not determined by the sample size alone. Instead, factors such as
the nature of the experimental task, the amount of practice that subjects have before the
collection of data, measurement error, and the experimental design utilized also affect data
stability in many unpredictable ways. The effects caused by such factors on the stability of the
data cannot be detected by the power analysis and must be addressed prior to the start of the
study.
In other words, the educational researcher studying science interest must consider the
amount of experience that students already had with telescopes and other novel tasks, the
potential problems associated with measuring interest through one’s self-report, and the benefits
of randomly assigning students to the two groups. These concerns as well as many other issues
related to the experimental design, such as the differences in teaching styles and curriculum
across the two groups, can also have an effect on the amount of science interest students
subsequently report in addition to the influence of the telescope. Power analyses, effect sizes,
and confidence intervals cannot and will not correct for any of these critical problems.
Chow (1998) continued his defense of NHST by questioning the appropriateness of effect
sizes. At the center of his criticisms, he accused the utilization of such statistical methods as an
attempt to mix statistical hypothesis testing with theory corroboration. Corroborating theory
involves more than testing the statistical hypothesis (Meehl, 1978). Chow further posited that the
impressiveness of the effect size depends upon the interpretation of the individual. In other
words, independent of judgment, the effect size offers little about the practical impact of the
result and is outside the domain of statistics. Again, consider that the interest researcher rejects
the null hypothesis and finds that a significant difference exists between the science interest of
those learning with the benefits of a telescope and those learning in a traditional manner.
Suppose the interest researcher is concerned about the problems associated with NHST and
follows the recommendation to report an effect size. The point biserial correlation indicates a
moderate effect size. Is a moderate effect size large enough to suggest that schools invest a large
amount of money in commercial grade telescopes to teach science to students in order to
improve students’ subsequent levels interest toward science? Will this improvement in science
interest be large enough to make a difference in students’ choices, such as enrolling in advanced
science courses or selecting a science related career? These questions cannot be answered by the
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effect size, but by educators and researchers who have a well developed theory concerning
science interest supported by longitudinal evidence based on randomized or matched designs.
Merging Improved Methodology and Practice
Interestingly, the apparently complicated search for the understanding of problems
associated with NHST leads back to concepts of basic research. Our educational researcher
studying science interest could have randomly selected and randomly assigned students to either
the group receiving science instruction with the telescope or to the group receiving traditional
science instruction. Randomization would address the presence of systematic differences
between the two groups. Recall the possibility that students attending the school that utilized the
telescope may have been of upper socioeconomic status, benefiting from greater novel science
experiences outside of school that could have raised their levels of science interest rather than
their experience with the school telescope. A randomized design would distribute these students
throughout the two groups, resulting in the random distribution of differences that would likely
be small enough to not drastically alter NHST results.
Well-trained researchers would prefer the use of a randomized design; however when
studying educational phenomena, researchers must often work within the existing structure. In
other words, limitations in financial resources and time often make randomized designs difficult
to employ. Our interest researcher would have considerable difficulty finding several schools
that would allow students to leave during their science class to attend the science class to which
they were randomly assigned and only for the length of time of the study. In addition, the parents
of students not assigned to the treatment condition, in this case the group receiving science
instruction with the telescope, would likely be upset that their children were not being given the
same opportunity to increase their science interest. The researcher, for ethical purposes, would
need to ultimately provide all students with the opportunity to use the telescope. Clearly
randomization can be a challenging issue when working in the educational system.
Beyond issues of sampling and randomization, researchers must also consider that even
when randomly selecting and assigning individuals an unusual group can result. Suppose the
interest researcher randomly selects and assigns students to the two science learning groups, one
with the opportunity to work with the telescope and one without. The researcher’s results lead to
a rejection of the null hypothesis indicating that those students working with the telescope have
higher levels of science interest. Even though the students were randomly selected and assigned,
which should have distributed individual differences randomly across the two groups, the
students in the treatment group could have entered the study with an already elevated interest in
science. Although this scenario is not probable, it is not impossible. Groups possessing extreme
characteristics can occur simply by chance, even though the chance is small. Therefore,
randomization is helpful, but not a solution.
This problem associated with probability must be addressed with theory development and
replication. Both researchers and practitioners should consider what they already know about a
phenomenon. When new results are considered in light of what is already known, new
information is much easier to interpret. Although researchers may employ Bayesian methods to
actually quantify what is already known, practitioners certainly have much to offer when they
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analyze their experiences using qualitative guidelines. Collaboration between research and
practice appears necessary in order to develop credible models that will inform education.
Furthermore, this relationship will promote the continued study of developed theory so that
educational outcomes can be evaluated and results replicated across schools.
Improvement in research methodology and replication will begin to provide the answers
to the questions that educational researchers are seeking. In addition, a reliance on the
development of theory, which involves collaboration between researchers and educators, will
yield more meaningful results in spite of the flaws associated with NHST. To meet the goal of
legislators to make education an evidence-based field (U.S. Department of Education, 2002),
educational researchers must do more than develop experimental designs. Burkhardt and
Schoenfeld (2003) argued that practitioners, including teachers and administrators, do not look to
research when solving problems and likely do not even consider educational research credible.
Merely conducting a greater number of experiments will likely make little difference to
practitioners, especially when individual experimental results that depend upon NHST do not
yield practical information. Although Burkhardt and Schoenfeld (2003) recommended structural
changes to address the lack of credibility in educational research, they also emphasized the
importance of appropriate theory development that stresses addressing practical problems.
Without these changes, advancement in educational practice is questionable.
As the field of education is on the cusp of a revolution, researchers and educators must
work together to develop theory that is meaningful and practical. However, researchers and
educators must recognize that NHST is only a tool that can be employed to inform their theory
development. Researchers must attend to sampling issues, random assignment, and measurement
error when designing experiments and must stress the importance of power, effect size, and
confidence intervals in their work so that practitioners can understand how best to utilize the
information. Without an understanding of the limitations of NHST, educators are destined to
make poor choices based on significant differences that have no practical value. This scenario
will not revolutionize the field of education, but will certainly impede it.
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